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ABSTRACT
This article assesses the legacy of the National Solidarity Programme in seven districts
of Wardak Province, Afghanistan. We find that the NSP largely achieved its devel-
opment objectives, but had limited effects on state–society relations. The findings
also raise questions about the sustainability of community-driven development in
insecure contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
Governments and donor agencies have increasingly relied on community-
based approaches to deliver development assistance in developing countries,
including in a large number of fragile and conﬂict-affected states.1 In contrast
to a development-spending model driven by centralized decision-making,
community-driven development (CDD) devolves some control of decision-
making and resources to local councils. By giving local communities a voice
in identifying development priorities and providing a mechanism to engage
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with local government on the provision of public services, advocates believe
that CDD programs result in better decisions on development spending,
greater legitimacy and accountability of the government to its citizens, and
more opportunities for vulnerable or oppressed groups to participate in local
politics.2 In areas under threat from insurgent groups, aid projects have often
been touted as a potential counter-insurgency tool, rewarding communities
under government control and preventing at-risk communities from defect-
ing to insurgents.
This paper challenges some core assumptions of this approach. We explore
the legacy of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), a ﬂagship CDD
program in Afghanistan, with an in-depth case study of the program’s impact
in Wardak, a province under severe threat by insurgents. To date, very few
studies have explored how CDD programs function in highly insecure con-
texts; hence, very little is known about how nascent local institutions devel-
oped under CDD adapt to conditions of deteriorating security. Wardak,
a relatively dangerous province with a signiﬁcant degree of insurgent activity,
provides opportunities to observe how resilient these institutions are in areas
where government control is strongly contested. Also, while most existing
evaluations of CDD have measured short- to medium-term impacts, this
study provides insights on how the NSP has functioned from its inception
in 2003 until the end of 2016.
While we ﬁnd that the NSP functioned as a relatively effective mechanism
for aid delivery, there is little evidence that it delivered transformative insti-
tutional changes in the long run or signiﬁcantly improved local perceptions of
the government. Instead, in most cases local councils set up under the NSP
became active only during periods when they received NSP project funding,
and remained dormant at other times. Generally, they played a role in other
governance activities only insofar as local council members overlapped with
other customary institutions. Rather than seeing themselves as afﬁliated with
the state, local council members in insecure areas were often highly critical of
the government and saw themselves as institutionally distinct, in some cases
openly collaborating with insurgents instead. Finally, we found that in more
conservative areas, institutional guidelines mandating the inclusion of
women in decision-making were rarely followed. These ﬁndings challenge
some of the theoretical assumptions underpinning CDD in insecure
2. Dongier et al., “Community Driven Development.”
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contexts, and suggest methodological improvements for how these programs
should be evaluated.
The ﬁndings presented here are based on approximately 70 interviews with
community members in seven districts in Wardak, additional interviews with
government and NGO service delivery providers, and three community
mapping exercises illuminating local power dynamics and governance
mechanisms. This article proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the
theoretical mechanisms of CDD and reviews the literature on the utility of
this approach in conﬂict-affected areas. The third section provides back-
ground on the NSP, with a particular focus on the program’s activities in
Wardak. The fourth section outlines the study’s approach and methodology.
The ﬁfth presents our results with respect to development and institutional
outcomes. We conclude by discussing theoretical and practical implications
for future CDD programs in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT
IN VIOLENT CONTEXTS
An ongoing debate in the political violence literature has concerned the
relative merits of “greed” versus “grievance” explanations for civil conﬂict.
One body of research has found a robust statistical link between poor
economic conditions—especially widespread poverty—and violence.3
Another school argues that conﬂict is primarily driven by local grievances
against the government, which are particularly exacerbated by perceived
inequalities between groups.4
Though not an approach designed solely for violent contexts, CDD
addresses aspects of both of these drivers of conﬂict. CDD is underpinned
by two theoretical logics.5 The ﬁrst concerns how CDD functions as
3. Paul Collier and Anke Hoefﬂer, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic
Papers 56:4 (2004); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,”
American Political Science Review 97:1 (2003).
4. Gudrun Østby, “Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conﬂict,” Journal of
Peace Research 45:2 (2008): 143–62; Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede
Gleditsch, “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison,” Amer-
ican Political Science Review 105:3 (2011): 478–95.
5. Bennett and D’Onofrio (“Community-Driven Development”) describe these logics
slightly differently in a three-logic framework: welfare, governance, and social cohesion. We have
opted for the two-logic framework above as closest in spirit to how informants we interviewed
conceptualized it.
1044  ASIAN SURVEY 58:6
a mechanism to improve local development outcomes. Because it gives
communities more control over how public resources are spent, CDD
advocates believe that it is a more efﬁcient method of reducing poverty than
other modalities. Consistent with the literature on the virtues of bottom-up
development, it holds that local residents have a better understanding of
their environment and needs than state planners, and stronger incentives
to reduce corruption and ensure that public goods are delivered as intended.6
Moreover, community members are often actively involved in constructing
development projects through the provision of local goods or labor, and thus
receive additional economic beneﬁts.
The second logic concerns the potential of CDD as a state-building tool to
precipitate transformative institutional changes. These transformations are
sometimes categorized as having both bonding and bridging effects.7
Bonding effects typically refer to fostering more trust and inclusiveness in
local communities. CDD programs work by establishing, training, and
empowering elected bodies in rural communities to plan and implement
development projects. By strengthening these bodies and giving them resources
to distribute in their communities, proponents believe, CDD programs
create receptive ground for democratic governance.8 Programs usually
include some participatory mandate for inclusiveness, ensuring representa-
tion of women and other marginalized groups, and thus reducing the risk of
unequal public goods distribution.9 Having achieved a measure of credibility
through public goods delivery, local councils are expected to eventually
expand into other areas of governance typically reserved for informal custom-
ary institutions, such as dispute resolution.10
Bridging effects refer to building trust between the central government and
local communities, fast-tracking the process of formal institution-building.
Extending formal state institutions in rural communities is often an expensive
and laborious process that may take decades, especially for governments with
6. Susan Wong and Scott Guggenheim, “Community-Driven Development: Myths and Rea-
lities,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8435, 2018.
7. Howard White, Radhika Menon, and Hugh Waddington, “Community-Driven Develop-
ment: Does It Build Social Cohesion or Infrastructure? A Mixed-Method Evidence Synthesis,”
International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, 2018.
8. Wong and Guggenheim, “Community-Driven Development.”
9. White, Menon, and Waddington, “Community-Driven Development.”
10. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Frac-
tured World (Oxford University Press, 2009).
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limited capacity. Creating local councils through CDD programs is an alter-
native means of establishing a presence in local communities and rapidly
demonstrating goodwill through the delivery of public goods. Once estab-
lished, councils are intended to serve as a bridge between the government and
local communities, providing information about community needs and act-
ing as an engagement hub for government line ministries.
Though distinct, this logic closely aligns with the counter-insurgency
literature focused on winning “hearts and minds” in contested areas.
This doctrine is rooted in the belief that the support of the population is
a critical resource, particularly in discouraging cooperation with opposition
groups and providing the government vital intelligence on insurgent activ-
ities. Advocates of this approach argue that good governance, primarily
through public goods provision, is a primary mechanism for building
government legitimacy and securing local allegiance.11 Community-driven
programs that improve public goods provision may therefore improve the
standing of the government in local communities, potentially dampening
insurgent activities.
While these assumptions have underpinned development and counter-
insurgency efforts in unstable regions of the world for the past two decades,
until recently there was little empirical evidence about their validity. In recent
years, a burgeoning literature has emerged testing these theoretical logics,
including a number of large-scale evaluations in countries affected by political
violence. Results have been mixed. Panel evidence collected over a four-year
period in Iraq suggests that the provision of public goods in local areas did
have a positive effect on perceptions of the government and led to signiﬁcant
reductions in violence.12 Another study found that local community devel-
opment projects in Afghanistan were well regarded by the public, but aid was
least effective—and often destabilizing—in areas where large amounts of
money were spent quickly, creating resentment between communities and
ample opportunities for extensive corruption.13
11. For a detailed model linking public service provision to reduced insurgent violence, see Eli
Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The
Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Journal of Political Economy 119:4 (2011): 766–819.
12. Ibid.
13. Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, “Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Rela-
tionship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan,” Feinstein International Center, Tufts Uni-
versity, 2012.
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Evaluations that have focused on how CDD programs function in violent
contexts have produced no clear consensus to date. A randomized ﬁeld
experiment testing the performance of the NSP in Afghanistan (an initiative
that supports community development councils in local towns and villages to
provide input on how development assistance is spent) found that the pro-
gram led to a signiﬁcant improvement in villagers’ perception of their own
economic well-being and their attitudes to the government.14 However,
a study summarizing evidence from multiple similar ﬁeld experiments in
sub-Saharan Africa found that results were often negligible and that programs
supporting participatory councils did not bring lasting improvement in social
cohesion.15 More recently, a review of 25 impact evaluations of CDD pro-
grams around the world found that, while CDD programs were generally
effective at producing small-scale infrastructure, they had little to no impact
on improving governance or social cohesion.16 Another literature review of
nearly 500 participatory programs also found little evidence that participatory
interventions led to long-lasting improvements in group cohesion, but noted
that they performed better than top-down government programs at deliver-
ing higher-quality public goods with less corruption.17
Case studies at the subnational level have suggested areas where more
theoretical sophistication is needed. With regard to the NSP, multiple studies
have noted that acceptance of elected councils and their role in local gover-
nance varies from community to community, including how council mem-
bers engage with customary elites.18 The degree to which community
development councils function as intended is contingent on a number of
factors that are neglected in existing theories, particularly the nature of pre-
existing communal institutions and practices.19 The longevity of CDD
14. Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov, “Winning Hearts and Minds
through Development Aid: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan,” Working Paper 166,
Centre for Economic and Financial Research, New Economic School, 2011.
15. Elisabeth King, Cyrus Samii, and Birte Snilstveit, “Interventions to Promote Social Cohesion
in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Development Effectiveness 2:3 (2010).
16. White, Menon, and Waddington, “Community-Driven Development.”
17. Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao, Localizing Development: Does Participation Work?
World Bank, 2012.
18. H. Nixon, “The Changing Face of Local Governance? Community Development Councils
in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2008; A. Pain, “Using Village Context
Analysis in Afghanistan: Methods and Wider Implications,” Working Paper 47, Secure Livelihoods
Research Consortium, London, 2016.
19. Pain, ibid.
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programs is another underexplored variable. An early study on the sustain-
ability of local councils set up under the NSP raised concerns that the
councils would likely wither away without sustained project funding, but
few studies have explored to what extent this has actually happened.20
Despite the accumulated evidence on CDD in conﬂict-affected countries,
there are signiﬁcant gaps in the literature. Evaluation methodologies often
measure impacts in the short-to-medium term. For example, a randomized
control trial on the NSP covered a four-year period from the baseline to the
endline.21 A recent review found that, of all known evaluations of CDD
programs worldwide, the longest available at the time of writing covered
a period of seven years.22 At present, there are very limited data on how
CDD programs fare in the long term.
Also, although a number of evaluations have been completed in conﬂict-
affected countries, data are often collected from relatively secure areas within
those contexts. The randomized NSP study above, for example, excluded
districts from the most insecure southern provinces of Afghanistan.23 The
lack of evidence on how CDD programs operate in insecure contexts
represents a major lacuna in current theoretical frameworks. While existing
theories of change may treat insurgencies as an exogenous factor, there is
ample evidence that once violent conﬂicts begin, local dynamics change
in fundamental and often unpredictable ways. These can have signiﬁcant
effects on how CDD programs operate and are received in beneﬁciary
communities.24 It is likely that a modiﬁed set of theoretical expectations is
appropriate for these contexts.
This study is a step toward addressing these gaps. We examine the legacy
of the NSP from 2003 to late 2016 in a province that has had an active
insurgency since 2006. Many of the villages proﬁled have received multiple
rounds of NSP funding, and local councils have been operating for a decade
or longer. The ﬁndings provide a rare window into how CDD programs
20. Jennifer Brick, “Investigating the Sustainability of Community Development Councils in
Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, 2008.
21. Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov, “Empowering Women through
Development Aid: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan,” American Political Science
Review 107:3 (2013): 540–57.
22. Wong and Guggenheim, “Community-Driven Development,” 24.
23. Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov, “Empowering Women.”
24. For an authoritative account of these dynamics, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence
in Civil War (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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operate in terms of both developmental and institutional logics in such an
environment, and how these logics are impacted by the active presence of
insurgent groups.
THE NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAMME
History and Structure of the NSP
Costing over US$ 2 billion between 2003 and 2016, the NSP was perhaps the
single largest and most far-reaching development assistance program in
Afghanistan’s history.25 It was funded by several international donors and
managed by the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
with some technical support from donors and international consultancy
ﬁrms. While security problems prevented the NSP from being delivered in
every community in Afghanistan, it was implemented widely, spanning
approximately 35,000 rural communities in all 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces.
The program commenced in 2003 and closed in early 2017, replaced by
a follow-up program called the Citizens’ Charter.
The NSP was delivered in three phases. The core elements of project
design remained consistent for all these phases, though minor adjustments
to policies and procedures were made over the years. Phase I ran from May
2003 to March 2007, reaching approximately 17,300 communities. Phase II
ran from April 2007 to September 2011, targeting an additional 6,000 com-
munities. Phase III ran from November 2011 to March 2017, adding a further
13,500 communities. In addition to expanding into new communities, Phase
II and Phase III also provided repeat grants to some beneﬁciaries from earlier
phases to be used for new projects.
In each village, the program rolled out as follows. At the outset, commu-
nity mobilizers employed by facilitating partners—typically local or inter-
national NGOs afﬁliated with the NSP—approached the village to
introduce the program. Next, they facilitated local elections, in which each
adult individual in a community voted by secret ballot for candidates to
form a community development council (CDC). Once the council was
established, the NSP gave its members capacity-building training to equip
them with the skills to assess and manage development projects. The
25. World Bank, “Community-Driven Development,” <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/
communitydrivendevelopment>, accessed July 18, 2018.
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community was allocated $200 per household by the Afghan government, to
be disbursed by the CDC on small pre-selected infrastructure development
projects. The CDCs selected either a project with a budget ceiling of the
combined household allocation for the village, or $60,000 for villages with
more than 300 households. Once approved, the project was constructed,
usually with the help of the NGO facilitating partners. The villages them-
selves were also required to contribute 10% of the project cost in cash,
materials, or labor. Some CDCs received more than one block grant in
subsequent rounds of the NSP.
From the beginning, the Afghan government and the donor community
had more-ambitious aspirations for the program. The NSP stipulated that
CDC leadership include an equal number of men and women, a signiﬁcant
break from traditional rules concerning the role of women in local gover-
nance. In addition to its role as a mechanism to deliver public goods, the NSP
was conceived as a means to transform governance in local communities,
providing a formal alternative to customary structures. Ashraf Ghani, then
minister of ﬁnance and one of the main architects of the NSP, saw the elected
CDCs as an antidote to traditional patronage-based politics and the inﬂuence
of local commanders. Although the CDCs formally existed in parallel with
customary structures, Ghani believed that the CDCs could expand their
mandate considerably:
Having gathered the necessary institutional and social capital and demon-
strated its usefulness in the creation of infrastructure and services . . . [the NSP]
is now ready to become the platform for a more ambitious series of under-
takings at the village level. It could, for instance, easily supervise the construction
of schools, clinics, and small dams, undertake agricultural extension services, or
become a mechanism for the registration and formalization of property rights
and dispute resolution at the village level.26
Beyond managing the NSP block grants, the CDCs were intended to act as
a mechanism with which government line ministries and NGOs could
coordinate to implement other public services and development projects
in the community. While the CDCs were tasked with improving commu-
nity welfare through infrastructure and local development, the long-term
goal of institution-building was therefore fundamental to the design and
26. Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, 168.
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assumptions underpinning the program. For at least a decade, the Afghan
government has been considering proposals to give CDCs some type
of formal institutional recognition, embedding them within existing state
hierarchies.27 This paper assesses how developmental and institutional
logics have fared in the province of Wardak, where the NSP has been
implemented since 2003.
WARDAK AND THE NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAMME
Wardak is an exceptionally challenging development context. It is a predom-
inantly agrarian society, and the vast majority of its roughly half a million
inhabitants live in rural areas.28 It ranks below the national average on
poverty, literacy, access to health services, and school attendance,
particularly for girls.29 Due to its strategic location just west of Kabul, the
province has experienced heavy ﬁghting since 2006, and territory is heavily
contested by government forces and opposition groups. Wardak is frequently
classiﬁed as one of the most insecure provinces in Afghanistan, and has one of
the highest rates of internally displaced persons in the country.30
Insecurity has gradually escalated in Wardak since the mid-2000s, with the
government losing control of territory over time. Wardak is about 35 km from
Kabul, making it a useful base for attacks on the capital.31 The province lies
along a key transportation link, the main highway between Kabul and the
southern provinces of Ghazni and Kandahar. A second important road runs
from the provincial capital of Maydan Shah to the central highlands of
Bamiyan. The strategic importance of this province has led to intense
ongoing conﬂict between insurgents and government forces.32
There are nine administrative districts in Wardak. Interviews were con-
ducted in seven of them: Markazi Behsud (Behsud I), Hesi-e Awali Behsud
27. Nixon, “Changing Face of Local Governance.”
28. World Bank, Afghanistan Provincial Briefs 2016, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/
afghanistan/publication/afghanistan-provincial-briefs-2016>, accessed August 26, 2018.
29. Ibid.
30. European Asylum Support Ofﬁce, “EASO Country of Origin Information Report: Afghan-
istan Security Situation, January 2016,” <https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/ﬁles/public/
EASO-COI-Afghanistan_Security_Situation-BZ0416001ENN_FV1.pdf>, accessed August 26, 2018.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
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(Behsud II), Jalrez, Maydan Shah, Nerkh, Sayd Abad, and Jaghatu.33 At the
time that the research was conducted, security conditions varied considerably
in the districts of interest. The two northwestern districts, Behsud I and II,
were relatively secure. These districts, linking the central highlands to the
Kabul-Kandahar corridor, have higher concentrations of ethnic Hazaras, and
insurgent activity is relatively low. However, these provinces have experi-
enced an ongoing and ethnically charged conﬂict between Pashtun nomads
and local Hazara residents regarding grazing rights.34
The other districts covered by the study have serious security issues. The
Afghan government controls only the main roads running through these
districts, while the Taliban has a widespread presence in rural areas. Nerkh,
in the east of the province, has experienced ﬁghting between insurgent group
Hezb-i-Islami [literally, Islamic Party] and the Taliban, with both groups also
engaged in combat operations against the government. Maydan Shah, the
district containing the provincial capital, is controlled by the government
within city limits and along the main roads in and out of Kabul, but is
otherwise strongly contested by insurgents. Multiple local security reports
collected during ﬁeldwork suggest that government ofﬁcials rarely travel
outside Maydan Shah.
In spite of the poor security situation, the NSP was widely implemented in
Wardak. In the seven districts where the research took place, CDCs imple-
mented at least 2,563 projects.35 Irrigation and transport accounted for more
than 50% of these, though there was considerable variation across districts.
The most frequently selected type of project in Behsud II, Jaghatu, and Jalrez
was irrigation, such as the improvement of irrigation canals and the mainte-
nance of karez (traditional irrigation) systems. Electriﬁcation projects were
more commonly selected by CDCs in Maydan Shah, Nerkh, and Sayd Abad.
These projects included the purchase of generators and the installation of
micro-hydropower systems to provide electricity to homes near running
water. Transportation projects, principally road and bridge construction,
were most frequently selected in mountainous Behsud I. Because the NSP
33. The other two districts, Chaki Wardak and Day Mirdad, were inaccessible during the
ﬁeldwork period.
34. LandInfo, “Afghanistan: The Conﬂict between Hazaras and Kuchis in the Behsud Districts of
Wardak Province,” 2011, <http://www.landinfo.no/asset/2057/1/20571.pdf>, accessed July 24, 2018.
35. Data provided by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan.
1052  ASIAN SURVEY 58:6
has remained active in the context of widespread insecurity, Wardak offers
a unique opportunity to study how dynamics of CDD are affected by
insurgent violence.
APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
Before starting key informant interviews with beneﬁciaries, nine preliminary
interviews were completed with government ofﬁcials and donors who worked
on the NSP between 2003 and 2016. The purpose of these interviews was to
understand more about the background and institutional context of the NSP,
as well as speciﬁc challenges in the province of Wardak. These interviews
were conducted in November 2016.
Out of a total of 909 villages that had received NSP funding, we selected
one in each of the seven target districts. Villages in each district were selected
from the full list of settlements that had received the NSP, with inaccessible
villages removed beforehand.36 We classiﬁed the remaining settlements ac-
cording to the different categories of development projects undertaken (irri-
gation, electriﬁcation, etc.), and then consulted local security experts in
selecting individual sampling points that captured a variety of these categories
while ensuring the safety of the research team. In each selected village, trained
enumerators conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with adult men,
women, and CDC members. Enumerators were instructed to interview
community members from a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds in the
village and to sample from marginalized groups in particular. The socioeco-
nomic background of respondents was determined by a subjective judgment
by enumerators based on a combination of factors (education, occupation,
quality of home and assets, social status in the village, etc.). Fieldwork was
conducted in November and December 2016.
One month after the ﬁrst round of ﬁeldwork was completed, a series of
community mapping exercises was conducted in a second round of qualita-
tive ﬁeld research in Nerkh, Behsud I, and Jaghatu. The exercises were
conducted by phone with community members who were initially contacted
during the in-person ﬁrst round of ﬁeldwork. The interviews aimed to
36. Given the sensitive nature of the questions and that fact that some respondents might be
identiﬁable by their positions, we do not reveal the names of the villages. In the rest of the paper we
refer to each location by its district name only.
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validate initial ﬁndings and insights from the ﬁrst round of interviews and to
collect additional information on the local political situation and community
dynamics.
Given that large areas of the province are under insurgent control, we
acknowledge that a limitation of this study is that ﬁeld researchers could
only visit villages with a minimum level of accessibility. Providing safe access
to target communities was our greatest challenge, especially for female ﬁeld
researchers. Women have very restricted mobility in Wardak, and it is difﬁ-
cult for them to travel from district to district without attracting attention.
Because we removed inaccessible villages in each district from the list of
potential sampling points, the remaining villages are generally located in areas
with more security, typically closer to the main roads. The ﬁndings are
therefore not necessarily representative of conditions in the province as
a whole. But almost all areas of Wardak are signiﬁcantly affected by insecu-
rity, and interviewees in almost all districts frequently cited security as a major
concern. It is likely that our ﬁndings apply even more strongly in the most
insecure areas. We therefore hold that, despite limitations on the ﬁeldwork,
the study provides valuable insights on the dynamics of CDD programs in
insecure contexts.
RESULTS
We examined the legacy of the NSP in the target communities in terms of
both developmental and institutional logics. The developmental logic ex-
plores how effective local councils were as a mechanism for delivering public
goods and enhancing economic welfare, examining their record on project
delivery and contributions to economic well-being across all socioeconomic
groups. The institutional logic is concerned with the transformational aspects
of CDD: the extent to which local councils became involved in responsibil-
ities typically reserved for customary institutions, broadened participation in
local decision-making, and built lasting links between communities and the
state resilient to challenges from insurgent groups.
Developmental Logic: Delivery of Public Goods
Overall, we found strong evidence that the NSP had contributed to the
development of public goods in the form of local infrastructure, resulting
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in tangible economic beneﬁts for community members. Respondents con-
ﬁrmed that most of their CDC’s selected projects had been constructed, and
there were few indications that planned infrastructure projects had been
abandoned. Community members in the target areas generally had a positive
perception of the infrastructure produced under the NSP and a strong appre-
ciation for the program in general.
In Jaghatu, for example, the local CDC allocated most of its resources to
a single infrastructure project: the construction and extension of an irriga-
tion canal.37 Community members reported that this canal is still widely
used for irrigation. They generally judged the canal to be of good quality,
though two respondents mentioned that they needed further funds for
maintenance. They also reported that the installation of the canal has
allowed people to create new farmland in previously unused areas, as the
supply of water to these areas has expanded. Some respondents claimed that
the project has principally beneﬁted those who own the extended farmland,
though they noted that others use the water from the canal as a source of
drinking water.
In Jalrez, by contrast, the CDC opted to construct a number of smaller
projects, including deep wells, a road, a water supply network, and solar
electricity. Locals complained that the ﬁrst project, a well, was a poorly
constructed failure, but reported that other projects are still frequently used.
Interviewees conﬁrmed that the road made it easier for community
members to travel, providing better access to health clinics and neighboring
communities. One community member praised the NSP for improving
the water supply network: “The NSP brought positive changes. . . . People
now take water from the water supply system. They are happy. They used
to use a donkey to fetch water but now they have it inside their homes.”38
NSP infrastructure projects were positively associated with economic ben-
eﬁts by most respondents. When asked to identify speciﬁc economic beneﬁts
created by the NSP, respondents in most villages identiﬁed two major im-
pacts. First, in communities where irrigation projects were undertaken, land-
owners who beneﬁted from improved water systems reported that they had
become wealthier as a direct result of the program. Furthermore, respondents
37. Data indicate it was started around 2010, but we could ﬁnd no record of when it was
completed.
38. Interview, driver from Jalrez District, December 8, 2016.
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in areas where roads were constructed reported an improvement in access to
markets, clinics, and other public services in the district centers.
Another widely reported economic beneﬁt was opportunities for tempo-
rary paid work during the construction period. Though these opportunities
were not long-lasting, it is notable that many respondents, particularly the
poorer ones, emphasized the positive economic impact of these short-term
jobs for their households over other economic beneﬁts. “The project
beneﬁted us economically because when we were constructing the water
reservoir, the people who were unemployed received an income for the
construction work,” said one housewife from Behsud I.39 Two farmers from
Behsud II also related that they personally received wages while working on
NSP construction projects.40
Respondents identiﬁed a few problems with distribution of funds through
the NSP. While respondents in most communities felt that economic ben-
eﬁts were distributed relatively equally, a small minority (about 16%) felt that
projects beneﬁted certain community members more than others. Generally,
this feeling was more common among lower-income respondents, particu-
larly those living further from infrastructure projects. As one laborer in
Behsud II put it: “All the people have had economic beneﬁts [from the
projects], but not me. I am in a very bad economic situation. Our economic
situation was not good before, and it is still not good. My land does not have
any crops. We are still poor people.”41
Another problem associated with some public goods delivered through the
NSP was a lack of sustainability. In Sayd Abad and Maydan Shah there were
complaints about electrical generators installed through the NSP that were no
longer operational due to a lack of planning to pay for fuel and maintenance,
a common criticism from most interviewees from these areas. As one
community member in Sayd Abad recalled:
The ﬁrst [NSP] project was an electricity program. Every house was respon-
sible for putting in money to operate the generator, and it worked for ﬁve
years. After that, people couldn’t afford to buy fuel for the generator or to
repair the machine due to our economic conditions. So now the generator is
39. Interview, housewife from Behsud I District, December 4, 2016.
40. Interviews, farmers from Behsud II District, December 5, 2016.
41. Interview, laborer from Behsud II District, December 5, 2016.
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not functioning. People are only beneﬁting from the bridge and the culvert,
not the electricity project.42
Similarly, in Behsud II community members unanimously complained about
a school project that was started in Phase I of the NSP but never ﬁnished,
leaving the community with no usable educational facility. Indeed, respon-
dents seemed to dwell on cases where projects had been started and failed or
fallen into disrepair, indicating that raising public expectations for service
delivery and subsequently failing to deliver may produce strong negative
reactions in terms of public goodwill.
Nonetheless, these failures were relatively rare; most public goods under-
taken in the seven villages were completed as planned and still operational.
The ﬁndings from these seven villages suggest that the NSP in Wardak was
indeed successful in achieving positive development outcomes, most of which
appear to be durable in the medium term. While four of the seven villages
reported that the NSP had delivered a piece of infrastructure that was either
incomplete or no longer in use, all villages were using at least some of the
infrastructure delivered through the program. It is also evident that the public
goods built through the CDCs are considered useful and needed by com-
munity members, and that they have at least in some cases delivered tangible
economic beneﬁts. Notably, all respondents interviewed were aware of the
NSP and could accurately identify something it had delivered, suggesting that
the NSP was a relatively effective and successful mechanism for delivering
public goods in the target communities.
Institutional Logic: Transforming Local Governance
The ﬁndings above suggest that the NSP has performed relatively well at
delivering developmental objectives, and that villagers are aware of its role in
bringing public goods into their communities. However, we found much
weaker evidence that these successes have translated into the kinds of insti-
tutional transformations expected, in terms of both bridging and bonding
effects. We found few indications that the establishment of the CDCs has
substantively altered the local dynamics of authority. Furthermore, insecurity
has become a signiﬁcant obstacle, in some cases leading to a complete break
between community leaders and state institutions.
42. Interview, farmer from Sayd Abad District, December 4, 2016.
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Roles and Responsibilities of CDCs in Local Communities
In the communities visited, the CDCs are seen primarily as a mechanism
for the delivery of the NSP’s infrastructure projects. When asked whether
they had contacted the CDCs to ask for assistance, community members
almost exclusively mentioned that they had done so to request new devel-
opment projects. There was little sense from the interviews that commu-
nities expected the CDCs to play other governance roles or provide any
other kinds of services.
Interviews with community members and CDC leaders provided few
examples of the CDCs resolving low-level disputes in the community,
which are instead addressed by customary authorities. In Behsud II, for
example, one respondent stated that “the CDC doesn’t resolve conﬂicts.
The local shura [assembly] works on this issue.”43 While some CDC mem-
bers told ﬁeld researchers that they had taken part in resolving disputes, it
was not a result of their position as a CDC member per se, but because of
their parallel roles in community shuras or other customary structures.
Where the CDC members are local elders, as in most of the communities
visited for this study, the CDC and customary forms of governance are
essentially interchangeable. According to one farmer in Jalrez, “The tribal
elders and the CDC intervene [in disputes] because the CDC members are
also the tribal elders.”44 Another CDC member in Jaghatu agreed: “In fact,
it is the responsibility of our malik [chief] to resolve local disputes, though I
also take part. . . . Just a short time ago a Pashtun girl escaped with a Hazara
boy, and then the malik went and freed that girl and brought her back from
Kabul to her family.”45
NSP experts interviewed for this project conﬁrmed this ﬁnding. While
dispute resolution was not envisaged as the initial function of the CDCs, it
was expected that, as trust with the community grew, they would gradually
take on additional local governance roles, including dispute resolution.
Instead, it appears that, at least in Wardak, customary institutions have
continued to be the principal fora through which local disputes are resolved.
In contested areas with a strong Taliban presence, the Taliban itself is a far
more signiﬁcant provider of justice and dispute resolution than the CDCs.
43. Interview, community member from Behsud II District, December 5, 2016.
44. Interview, driver from Jalrez District, December 8, 2016.
45. Interview, CDC member from Jaghatu District, December 3, 2016.
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Respondents in four of the seven districts told enumerators that the Taliban
and other opposition groups such as Hezb-i-Islami were primarily responsible
for resolving disputes in their communities.
Bridging CDCs and the State
We found limited evidence that the CDCs serve a bridging function between
villages and higher state institutions. In theory, the establishment of CDCs
would have provided government line ministries and NGOs with a commu-
nity-level body through which service provision could be administered and
organized. The evidence collected here suggests that this has only taken place
to a limited extent.
In Jalrez, Behsud II, Maydan Shah, and Syad Abad, CDC members
interviewed reported that they have not worked with any government depart-
ment to deliver services. In Nerkh and Jaghatu, CDC members reported that
they had worked with government line ministries in the past, but that this has
now stopped due to the worsening security situation. Only in one of the
villages, Behsud I, did CDC members report that the government was
engaged with the CDCs on education and agriculture services on a periodic
basis.46 Overall, it appears that the government is currently providing no
services in these communities through the CDCs, aside from technical
support for agriculture and education in Behsud I.47
On the contrary, in many of these communities, both NGOs and gov-
ernment ofﬁcials are largely absent. Rather than viewing the CDCs as aligned
with the government, CDC ofﬁcials and community members generally view
CDCs as a separate body entirely. Interviewees in the more insecure districts
had few positive things to say about their interactions with government
institutions. In Sayd Abad, the CDC head himself spoke contemptuously
of the government: “In fact, government ofﬁcials cannot get out of Kabul, so
how could they come here? They have made towers for themselves in Kabul
46. Interview, CDC member from Behsud I, December 4, 2016.
47. This ﬁnding was contested by interviewees at the central and district level who had worked
on the NSP in Wardak. They reported that CDCs regularly lobby the government and NGOs to
attract funding for further projects, and that more than 10% of CDCs in Hesa-e Awal Behsud,
Markaz Behsud, and Jalrez have succeeded in ﬁnding this funding. However, community members
and CDC ofﬁcials interviewed in these areas did not substantiate this claim.
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to hide behind. Security is bad, and no one can come here.”48 The CDC head
in Maydan Shah claimed to have contact with NSP ofﬁcials but no others,
and expressed similar frustrations with the government: “We don’t want to
keep relations with the military—we are tired of them. To provide projects
and serve the people is good, but they put innocent people in prison . . .
[which] increases the distance between the government and the people.”49
The head of the CDC in Jaghatu went further, claiming that they were no
longer registered with the government and had no contact with NGOs either:
“We are only CDCs in name.”50
Overall, the evidence suggests that in the areas where they are able to
operate, CDCs have not become the preeminent source of local governance
in Wardak. There are few indications that the government is using them as
a conduit for the work of central line ministries, nor do they provide a link to
the central government for the majority of communities interviewed, with
the exception of Behsud I. CDC members interviewed did not appear to see
themselves as afﬁliated or accountable to government institutions; on the
contrary, they saw themselves strictly as local representatives of their villages,
and were often highly critical of the government.
Participatory Governance through CDCs
One of the broader objectives of the NSP was to improve representation and
inclusiveness in local governance by making CDCs fully participatory, with
quotas for traditionally marginalized groups. CDC members were elected
through local democratic elections facilitated by NGOs, in which every
member of the community had one vote. As noted, NSP guidelines stipulate
that women should be equally represented on the local councils.
Respondents conﬁrmed that CDC elections had indeed occurred in their
communities, and generally felt themselves to be adequately represented.
“The CDC is accountable to the people and they do everything for the people
in this area. . . . [The beneﬁting of some groups over others] has not taken
place in this area,” stated one laborer from Behsud II.51 Another community
member from Jalrez agreed, stating: “I want to say, as an individual in the
48. Interview, CDC head from Sayd Abad, December 4, 2016.
49. Interview, CDC head in Maydan Shah, December 6, 2016.
50. Interview, CDC head from Jaghatu, December 3, 2016.
51. Interview, laborer from Behsud II District, December 5, 2016.
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community, that the CDC does its work very transparently.”52 Respondents
were unanimously content with the electoral system used to select CDC
members, and we uncovered no complaints that the election process was
perceived as rigged or unfair.
However, the communities proﬁled in Wardak performed poorly in ensur-
ing equal female participation. Of the seven CDCs proﬁled, respondents in
ﬁve—Jaghatu, Jalrez, Maydan Shah, Nerkh, and Sayd Abad—unanimously
reported that no women had ever served on their CDC. Both male and
female respondents in these areas expressed belief that women in their com-
munities were not educated enough to participate as CDC members and that
it was inappropriate for them to do so. The ﬁndings suggest that particularly
in the Pashtun-majority areas of Wardak, the NSP has not been successful in
securing female participation in local governance. In these areas, the estab-
lishment of female participation in CDCs is extremely challenging, given the
mixture of conservative cultural attitudes, low levels of female education, and
a high level of insecurity in these districts, exacerbated by the presence of
Taliban forces.
In contrast, in Behsud I and II, the two Hazara-majority districts in the
northwest of the province, CDCs included female members. However, atti-
tudes to female participation differed between men and women. Female
respondents interviewed in these areas commended the NSP for mandating
female participation. They felt it was meaningful, and that female CDC
members had some inﬂuence on determining local priorities. However, the
perception of male community members was somewhat different. In Behsud
I and II, male community members described the signiﬁcance of female
participation in the CDC as very limited. Despite efforts by the NSP to
promote the beneﬁts of gender equality, the perceptions of male interviewees
regarding female CDC members remains highly inﬂuenced by traditional
beliefs about the appropriate roles of women. “There are women in our
CDC,” said one male CDC member in Behsud I, “but as the women don’t
have enough education, they can’t do anything.”53 A community member
from the same village agreed: “The women are not educated, they are like
blind people. The men do everything [in the CDCs].”54
52. Interview, driver from Jalrez District, December 8, 2016.
53. Interview, CDC member from Behsud I District, December 5, 2016.
54. Interview, farmer from Behsud I District, December 5, 2016.
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Insecurity and the Sustainability of the CDCs
While we could not reach communities in the most insecure areas of the
province, NSP employees estimated that a substantial number of CDCs in
remote, Taliban-controlled areas of Jaghatu, Nerkh, Sayd Abad, and Maydan
Shah have ceased to function meaningfully. Generally, these CDCs were
located in the villages farthest from the district centers.
In the communities we could reach, we found that council members coped
with mounting insecurity in a number of ways. First, although all commu-
nities nominally had CDCs, ﬁve of the seven councils, all located in relatively
insecure areas, had become functionally inactive. Interviewees commonly
mentioned two main reasons for this. In Sayd Abad, respondents mentioned
that CDCs were speciﬁcally targeted by insurgent groups as part of their
campaign against the government. CDC members reported that they were
warned to stop their work by the Taliban, and that they were afraid of being
associated with the CDC. This fear was also shared by community members,
impeding the ability of CDCs to play a leadership role: “We don’t approach
[CDC members] because it is a security threat for us,” said one housewife in
Sayd Abad.55 Amore commonly mentioned reason in other communities was
that, as insecurity rose, government agencies and NGOs withdrew from the
area, and there were no projects to implement and therefore no reason for
CDCs to continue with meetings. Respondents in the more insecure districts
blamed the lack of projects on poor security conditions, and repeatedly stated
that the government should be focused on improving security over all other
priorities. “The NSP should start ﬁrst with security, because without security
nothing can be done in our area,” said one respondent from Nerkh.56
Another CDC member, from Sayd Abad, agreed: “We need security more
than ﬁnancial support; if there is security in our area there will be a lot of
work opportunities. . . . In the past, our projects were interrupted because of
ﬁghting in the area.”57
When asked how CDCs had continued to operate in the presence of
insurgent forces when the NSP was active, interviewees in four of the seven
villages explained that their councils actively collaborated with insurgent
forces and continue to do so. For example, community members in Nerkh
55. Interview, housewife from Sayd Abad District, December 4, 2016.
56. Interview, driver from Nerkh District, December 7, 2016.
57. Interview, CDC member from Sayd Abad District, December 4, 2016.
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explained that the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami dominate village politics, with
the latter operating checkpoints in the immediate vicinity of the village and
the former operating checkpoints nearby. According to respondents, these
two groups are the most important local political actors and can inﬂuence
how resources are spent, including NGO funding. Similarly, multiple
respondents in Jaghatu openly stated that their CDC members (who were
also the traditional village elders) were cooperating with Taliban forces, and
that Taliban insurgents played an active role in village politics. By contrast,
the government had little to no presence or inﬂuence. While CDCs may
continue playing a development role under these circumstances, they are
clearly not functioning as a mechanism for furthering government
legitimacy or transforming local politics in the manner intended by the
NSP’s planners. Instead, these dynamics demonstrate the weakness of insti-
tutional logics in the context of armed politics and the resilience of cus-
tomary forms of authority at the village level. Under these conditions, CDC
members see themselves, and behave, not as agents of the state but primar-
ily as representatives of their local communities, with few upward ties and
little accountability.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study assesses the extent to which the NSP has achieved its developmen-
tal and institutional goals inWardak Province. From a developmental point of
view, the NSP has succeeded in improving access to infrastructure and services
for people in the targeted communities, which has brought tangible economic
beneﬁts in the villages proﬁled. Although we ﬁnd that these beneﬁts are not
necessarily enjoyed equally by every member of the community, there are
more people who have access to infrastructure and services than prior to the
NSP. Though our conclusions are limited to the villages included in the
study, they are consistent with other evaluations in Afghanistan and elsewhere
that have documented improvements in basic infrastructure and public
welfare as a result of CDD programs. However, we did not ﬁnd much
evidence for the success of the NSP’s broader institutional goals, either in
terms of expanding their mandate beyond developmental activities or in
bridging local communities and state institutions. Participation in CDCs
generally reﬂected local norms, with more-conservative areas refusing to com-
ply with mandates for female representation.
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The ﬁndings offer a number of important theoretical and practical
insights. First, the ﬁndings challenge theoretical assumptions linking CDD
programs to transformational models of statebuilding. While local councils
established under the NSP performed reasonably well at their primary
mandate of delivering development projects, there is scant evidence that their
remits ever expanded, or that local community members ever saw them as
anything more than an institution to oversee the dispersion of aid. Further-
more, we observed that CDC members did not necessarily see themselves as
afﬁliated with the state, and community members often differentiated
between government institutions and CDCs. These ﬁndings cast doubt on
whether CDD programs alone can work as an effective device to further
government legitimacy and thus function as an effective counterinsurgency
tool. It is notable that CDC members who were highly critical of the gov-
ernment and expressed a desire to cut ties with it still praised the NSP and
signaled a willingness to continue accepting aid funds, indicating that active
participation in the NSP is a poor proxy for popular sentiment about the
government as a whole.
Another insight of this study is that many of the developmental gains of
the NSP appear to be ﬂeeting. While much of the infrastructure created
under the NSP is still intact, there is a distinct lack of clarity about the
sustainability and long-term maintenance of this infrastructure. A few pro-
jects we found required considerable maintenance or had fallen into disrepair.
This is particularly the case in more insecure districts, where development
projects have mostly ceased and government activities are almost completely
absent. This ﬁnding has methodological implications for how CDD
programs are evaluated. Most evaluations are completed shortly after the
completion of the program and rarely set aside funds to evaluate medium-
or long-term effects. But the ﬁndings raise questions about the durability of
both developmental outcomes and institutional achievements in the long
term. Furthermore, setting expectations for the provision of public goods
without a sustainable plan to maintain them may have the ultimate effect of
creating distrust of the government if those goods ultimately fail. Future
evaluations should seek to measure impact over a longer period, particularly
in violent contexts where government control is constantly in ﬂux.
In terms of theoretical contributions, this study concurs with other evi-
dence that CDDs can serve as a relatively effective mechanism for develop-
ment spending, even in areas beset by insurgency. However, it is increasingly
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questionable whether a CDD program like this, highly dependent on the
distribution of aid, can genuinely function as a mechanism for expanding
state authority in highly insecure areas. The evidence presented here suggests
that the underlying institutional assumptions are too ambitious, at least
within a limited timeframe. While public goods delivery may weakly, tem-
porarily translate into higher trust in government institutions, we found that
opinions about the government were more strongly determined by other
issues, chieﬂy local interactions with security forces and the perceived ability
of the government to keep local communities safe.
Theoretical frameworks in violent contexts should therefore take into
account that there appears to be a hierarchy of public goods in terms of
fostering state–society relations, with security and well-functioning mecha-
nisms for dispute resolution given a higher priority than infrastructure and
other public services. We suggest that institutional theoretical frameworks
include more speciﬁc outcomes on governance, with more clarity on how
success in this domain can be measured. Practically speaking, implementers
should seek to integrate CDD programs within sustainable frameworks for
public service delivery, while downgrading expectations about their potential
for institutional transformation in highly insecure contexts.
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